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Reading Reece Jones’s Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move1. 
 
 
Introduction. Violent borders and the space of political futures 
 
Sara Fregonese and Jonathan Rokem 
 
The news in those days was full of war and migrants and nativists, 
and it was full of fracturing too, of regions pulling away from 
nations, and cities pulling away from hinterlands, and it seemed 
that as everyone was coming together everyone was also moving 
apart. Without borders nations appeared to be becoming 
somewhat illusory, and people were questioning what role they 
had to play. Many were arguing that smaller units made more 
sense, but other argued that smaller units would not defend 
themselves.” (Hamid 2018, 155) 
 
This forum is around Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move by Reece Jones, the 
winning volume of the first edition of the biennial book award of the Political Geography 
Research Group of the Royal Geographic Society with IBG (PolGRG)2 in conjunction with 
Political Geography Journal. The book award3 was established in 2016 to give recognition to 
new academic volumes that engage with the thematic remit of PolGRG and contribute to 
develop the diverse field of political geography more widely. In line with the diversity of 
PolGRG interests and membership, the PolGRG Book Award is aimed at published volumes 
advancing the debate around themes spanning territoriality and sovereignty; states, cities, 
and citizenship; geopolitics, political economy and political ecology; migration, globalization 
and (post)colonialism; social movements and governance; peace, conflict and security. All 
this appreciating the implications of these phenomena with gender, race, class, sexuality 
and religion. Importantly, the idea of a book award was conceived to reward the slow and 
cumulative work that goes into publishing scholarly volumes. This kind of academic 
endeavour reclaims the topics of “quality” and cumulative work into the recent debates 
around neoliberal competitiveness, standardised bibliometrics (Benjaminsen et al. 2019; 
Berg, Huijbens, and Larsen 2016) and the pressure mounted by the academe on rapidly 
‘churning out’ outputs in order to satisfy those metrics. The first edition of the book award 
had a successful response, with ten outstanding nominations, and was at the same time a 
learning process for organisers both in PolGRG and Political Geography. We want to use this 
 
1 Reading Reece Jones’s Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move. 224 pages, Verso, New York and London (2017). 
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space to thank the five judges of the first edition for dedicating their time to read and write 
extensive reviews of the nominated books, and for participating in the shortlisting process.  
 
As we write, the second edition2 of the award is under way, overseen by a new PolGRG 
committee and, soon, a new panel of judges. We trust we initiated a process that is 
rigorous, but also enjoyable and that above all highlights the excellence and variety of the 
field and its scholarly community. For this, the book award is open to all scholarly volumes 
published in the two years preceding the call for nominations, and we are clear that this 
process ought to be inclusive of the most diverse range of authors, positionalities, contexts,  
approaches and topics across and beyond UK and anglophone political geography, with  
emphasis on early carrier authors and on contributions from/on the Global South. 
 
Borders, doors and the space for political futures In his novel Exit West, Mohsin Hamid 
(2018) describes a planet strained by conflict and consequent mass displacement, and 
eventually redesigned in its national and urban boundaries and territories. One of the key 
components of the planetary geopolitical shakeup in Exit West is the presence of ‘doors’: 
secret passages – increasingly controlled by profiteering traffickers - connecting different 
locations throughout the globe, and accessed by individuals and groups escaping from their 
places of origin in order to save or improve their lives, but not knowing where any door will 
lead. The book presents a dystopic urban geography where mounting societal polarisation, 
explodes into urban clashes and military operations to evict communities of migrants from 
vacant mansions in London’s wealthiest areas. After a period of turmoil, the migrants are 
employed in precarious conditions to construct new satellite towns on the outskirts of 
metropolises. Much like the fictional escape doors and changing global geographies of Exit 
West, Violent Borders presents the (often violent) implications of the global trend towards 
stopping population flows, but it also signals the presence of possibilities: new spaces for 
transnational mobility to happen beyond the violence of the border. It allows to devise new 
political narratives of migration and movement: spaces for political futures that offer 
counter-narratives to the multi-scalar ruptures (territorial, urban, personal, of kinship) that 
borders create and perpetuate. 
 
Three themes emerge from this forum, which we envisage can shape future geographical 
discussions on migration to help decipher how borders work now, how they could be in the 
future - and if they ought to be at all. These are: the distinctive role of political geographers 
in informing current migration and displacement debates; the role of sub-national and 
urban spaces; and the attention to history. 
 
The first theme concerns the role and impact of political geography in producing original 
spatial understandings and perspectives that can provide solid evidence usable in policy and 
activism. In an academia that is rife with migration-related work from a variety of 
disciplines, what specific perspectives and real-world approaches can political geographers 
bring? This question resonates in Nando Sigona’s piece, when he discusses the possibility of 
reconciling the scholarly effort of accounting for the vastity of the issue of governing 
migration globally, with the particular and embodied perspectives from particular locations, 
in a way that makes justice to the localised nuances of border politics. Political geographers 
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are well placed to relate micro- and macro-scale accounts of space and politics, and to 
relate ethnographic attention to context with (geo)political mappings at larger scales. 
Political geographers are also well positioned to question - even pose the bases for 
resistance against - those mappings. For example, as the conflict in Syria is giving way to 
reconstruction, new political maps of the area (especially NE Syria) are being drawn, with 
the aim of (re)framing specific national minorities (like the various Kurdish organisations) 
but also to, effectively, create what are refugee-free zones at state borders. How can we 
push back on such questionable macro-mappings of migration management, and use 
microaccounts to posit the geographies of more sustainable political futures? 
 
The second theme that emerges is partially related to the first, as it remarks the importance 
of scale and of accounting not only for national borders, but also for the sub-national 
impacts and dynamics of bordering to govern migration and movement. As Jonathan Rokem 
argues in this forum, pressured municipalities are left to deal with varying degrees of local 
polarisation and social acceptance and asylum legislation in terms of where in the city and in 
which cities migrants are permitted or not to live – a point remarked also by Beste İşleyen in 
this forum. Cities are changing with the migration crisis: not only in size and functions, but 
because the very practices of border securitization are currently implemented inside cities 
(Bialasiewicz 2015; İşleyen 2018). A sub-national look at migration allows therefore to tell 
different stories, identify new actors and connect them with less explored local urban 
geopolitical contexts (Rokem and Fregonese 2017). The local scale is left to deal with 
providing refuge and sanctuary where the nation state and its violent bordermaking 
practices have not only failed to ‘keep out’ migrants and asylum seekers, but also strip them 
from basic human rights in the host society. 
 
The third theme pertains to the importance of writing spatial histories of the current 
‘migration crisis’: histories that understand its spatial production, genealogy, and take a 
critical stand on its supposed unprecedentedness. One of the most powerful lines running 
across Violent Borders is that we cannot separate the history of borders from that of 
modern capitalism, and that the former are the spatial mechanism for the latter. This is 
aptly argued by İşleyen’s, as “the national border …becomes integral to policies and 
practices of refugee labour extraction during crisis times.” (İşleyen, this forum); but also, we 
would add, the border is part and parcel of capital accumulation and its shifting global 
geographies of power, risk and inequality. 
 
Reece Jones’ response to his three reviewers in this forum is an occasion to present Violent 
Borders in the wider context of his other published and forthcoming books, and the 
direction that his scholarship is taking towards historical inquiry into the evolution, presence 
and politics of border making. Spatial histories are certainly not lacking in political 
geography (Elden 2013b; 2010; 2013a). However, it seems now imperative, in the current 
fog of fake news, populism, and polarised politics, that systematic and rigorous historical 
accounts of borders and of bordering – and relatedly of migration and border crossing – are 
necessary to bring more clarity to the current geopolitical mappings, to trace not so much 
the original truths about the violence of borders against population movement, but the 
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spatial process that got us to this point throughout successive moments in history. Here, the 
critical historical work of scholarly networks like Refugee History 
(http://refugeehistory.org/about) and of scholars like Mezna Qato and Benjamin Thomas 
White into the politics of archives, the geographical thinking of stateless societies (Qato 
2018; 2019), and the historical enquiry of practices and politics of humanitarian evacuation 
(White 2019) are few but powerful examples of much needed historical lenses to questions 
of refugeeness and displacement, which political geography could certainly benefit from. 
We ought to engage the specific strength of political geography in showing how particular 
and localised experiences are never disjointed from wider geopolitical dynamics and Jones is 
right in pointing his “unique position to write a comparative account, drawing together 
these disparate strands into a broader global study” (Jones, this forum). 
It would require a major shift in the modern nation state’s political economy to allow for 
more inclusive and open border practices. The current European and international political 
climate favours keeping control of immigration as the top priority, leading to further border 
surveillance and national security (Sigona this forum), often using narratives of 
“unprecedentedness” to justify its approaches. This is when historical analytic tools can add 
value to political geography’s spatial (counter)imaginations and politics of resistance, 
pointing us towards new ways of preventing violent borders and domestic battlefields from 
being the predominant way of envisaging the political spaces of migration and instead 
imagine new spaces for alternative political futures. 
 
 
Borders and the violent politics of boundary making 
 
By Nando Sigona 
 
In June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted by a majority of 52% to leave the European 
Union (EU). In the run-up to the EU referendum, public concerns about migration and 
antiimmigration sentiments reached record levels which translated into support for the 
Leave option. The Vote Leave campaign, designated by the UK’s Electoral Commission as the 
official campaign in favour of leaving the European Union in the Referendum, captured 
public imagination with a simple and alluring slogan: ‘Take back control’, which effectively 
combined a sense of a positive future, with a not-so-subtle undertone of Empire nostalgia. 
Similarly, days before the referendum, Nigel Farage, the leader of the other pro-leave 
campaign Leave.EU, proudly posed in front of a large billboard portraying a long queue of 
refugees, accusing the EU of ‘having failed us all’, hinting to an alleged invasion of the UK by 
refugees which official data show never occurred (Sigona 2016) . Offering some insights into 
what ‘take back control’ means to Brexit-supporting politicians, Farage’s billboard calls for 
Britain to ‘break free of the EU and take back control of our borders’. 
 
Both during the referendum campaign and in the protracted negotiation period that 
followed, immigration and borders have been at the core of the narrative on ‘taking back 
control’, intimately connected if not inseparable. Former PM Theresa May used ‘the hostile 
environment’, her flagship immigration policy as Home Secretary, as a proof of her 
suitability to lead the country through the Brexit negotiations. And, despite data show that 
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not only antiimmigration sentiments declined since the EU referendum but also less EU 
nationals are moving to Britain and more EU residents are leaving the country, May insisted 
in keeping control of immigration, and consequently the end of freedom of movements for 
EU nationals, as a red line in her negotiation strategy. The UK pro-leave political landscape is 
by no means an exception in what is by now considered as a Europe-wide turn to nativism, 
populism and anti-immigration sentiment and policies.  
 
At the southern border of Europe, Matteo Salvini, Italy’s Home Secretary and 
Deputy PM, made the fight of ‘illegal immigration’ his flagship political battle. Echoing 
Farage’s script, he successfully managed to link two agendas, the Eurosceptic and the 
antiimmigration ones, blaming the EU for not doing enough to support Italy in dealing with 
sea arrivals and/or constraining Italy’s capacity of closing Italian ports to Search and Rescue 
(SAR) boats. In June 2019, the tension between Salvini’s far-right anti-globalist agenda 
(sovranista in Italian) and Italy’s obligations vis-à-vis the EU and the international 
community came to the fore when a SAR vessel, Sea Watch 3, with 53 rescued people on 
board was refused disembarkation for over two weeks until eventually its captain Carola 
Rackete decided to defy the order from the Italian authorities and disembarked in 
Lampedusa. She was successively arrested, but soon released following a judicial review of 
the case that found the order given by the Italian authorities on the basis of the recently 
passed Security Decree was in breach of international law and obligation regarding sea 
rescue.  
 
To Matteo Salvini’s supporters, including in mainstream media, the landing of Sea 
Watch 3 was the proof of Italy being under siege, its sovereignty and national borders 
violated, not only by migrants, but by a German captain and a woman. Commenting on the 
day of the arrest of Carola Rackete in Lampedusa, Italy’s Home Secretary stated: ‘We are 
not fools, we have rules, laws and borders. So those who made this mistake will pay for it. I 
guarantee that to the Italian people’4. For days national and international media covered 
the Sea Watch 3 case, references to the ‘migration crisis’ peaked both among supporters 
and detractors of Salvini, paradoxically ignoring the fact that compared to previous years 
there is no evidence of a ‘migration crisis’, at least in terms of sea arrivals. According to 
UNHCR (2019) data in June 2019 the Italian authorities recorded 1218 arrivals, the average 
for the month of June during the so-called ‘migration crisis’ (2014-2017) was over 22,000. 
Farage’s billboard recalling not just a refugee ‘invasion’ that never was, but also a fictional 
queue of refugees at the British border, and Salvini’s carefully choreographed ‘migration 
crisis’ without migrants are illustrations of what Nicholas De Genova termed the ‘Border 
Spectacle’, in which the materiality and performativity of border enforcement practices is 
‘persistently and repetitively’ implicated ‘in the symbolic and ideological production of a 
brightly lit scene of ‘exclusion’ that is always in reality inseparable from an obscene fact of 
subordinate inclusion that transpires in its shadows’ (De Genova 2014: 24; see also Tazzioli 
and Walters 2016) In other words, borders operate as filtering technologies that turn people 
on the move into ‘immigrants’ and attribute (or not) them rights and entitlements as well as 
 
4 The videoclip of the Al Jazeera piece on the disembarkation of Sea Watch 3 is available here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mS9Dkl27MzI (accessed on 22 July 2019). 
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a position in the social hierarchy. But, as Karakayali and Rigo (2010) argue, they are in turn 
activated by migrant mobilities. 
 
These examples chronologically follow the publication of Reece Jones’s fascinating and 
compelling book Violent Borders. They help us to focus on some aspects at the margin of 
Jones’s analysis of what and who are borders for, in particular concerning the spectacular 
politics of boundary-making. Violent Borders takes the Mediterranean ‘refugee crisis’ and in 
particular the tragic deaths of tens of thousands migrants who perished during the sea 
crossing as a point of departure to examine the different forms of violence embodied in 
borders and their root causes. From a parking lot in Tangier in Morocco, to a garment 
factory in Bangladesh, from the desert of Arizona to the contested border zone in Kashmir, 
from the US of Roosevelt’s New Deal to the 1607 Midlands peasant revolt led by Captain 
Pouch, Reece Jones takes his readers to distant places in search of commonalities and 
connections. The publication of this book came at a crucial time. In the US President-elect 
Donald Trump was promising to build an ‘impenetrable, physical, tall, powerful, and 
beautiful’ wall between the US and Mexico5. a project that has encountered strong 
resistance during his first mandate, including from politicians who had previously supported 
similar arrangements. Meanwhile the EU was forced by member states to partially and 
temporarily suspend the Schengen treaty and reinstates long disused internal border 
crossings, and to transfer enormous resources to the EU Border Agency FRONTEX to deter 
and monitor irregular crossings. Interestingly, since the publication of the book, the focus of 
EU responses to Mediterranean crossings has gradually shifted away from the sea, towards 
border externalisation and proxy border enforcement (McMahon and Sigona 2018), leaving 
the Mediterranean relatively empty of migrant vessels, and yet vividly present in public 
imagination and political discourse. 
 
Responding to the EU rhetoric that proclaims war to smugglers, which are accused to be the 
main cause of the ‘migration crisis’ and of migrant deaths at sea (Crawley et al. 2017), Jones 
argues that for the tragic deaths at the EU’s southern sea borders, it is not the smugglers 
but EU border policy and practice that should be blamed. This argument echoes sociologist 
Bridget Anderson’s examination of the weaponization of the language of harm prevention 
and protection by policy makers as discursive device to capture migrants – and, in this case, 
conveniently save them from migrating to Europe (Anderson 2012). 
 
In the book, Reece Jones argues for a borderless world as an answer to the forces of 
globalisation that have produced unprecedented levels of income inequality in the world. 
He argues that ‘the structural violence of borders is at the foundation of the state’ and 
‘walls, borders, maps, properties, identity documents, and enclosure laws are technologies 
of governance that are fundamentally about controlling and excluding’ (2016: 65) the global 
poor. He identifies in the removal of barriers to the movement of migrant workers the 
solution to global inequality interpreted in an Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems 
 
5 http://www.wsj.com/video/trump-reups-plan-for-wall-paid-for-by-mexico/C4773FE7-116B-48B2-8AEA- 
53D562C4E6DD.html (accessed on 22 October 2019). 
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tradition. The global poor, Jones argues, is the primary victim of violent borders, among 
them the thousands who died crossing the Mediterranean in the last decade56. 
 
The breath and spread of historical examples and empirical case studies makes the book a 
stimulating and engaging reading, although at times a bit bird-eyed on details, with 
idiosyncrasies and nuances lost in the process. The unfolding of the argument occasionally 
suffers from abrupt transitions, with the connections between parts hinted to rather than 
fully developed, including the lack of attention to the interaction between the border and 
the production of different nomenclatures of mobility (Zetter 1991; Sigona 2018). 
In the quest for establishing the foundations of his global political economy of borders, 
Reece Jones leave aside some of the other functions, political, cultural and symbolic, that 
the borders play especially within the state. Jones’ borders are largely mono-dimensional in 
that they are all projected towards the outside, separating imagined homogeneous nations, 
and relentlessly working to deny access to the global poor, who as a result remains locked in 
dangerous and exploitative factories in countries like Bangladesh working in miserable 
conditions for the Western textile industry. But, going back to the powerful image on the 
book cover, while the tragedy of migrant deaths at sea has certainly made the 
Mediterranean a huge cemetery, the wider picture is that the large majority of those 
crossing the sea at the time of the Mediterranean ‘crisis’ landed safely. 
 
The question that Violent Borders leaves largely unanswered is: what does the border do to 
them? For Anderson et al (2009: 5), ‘the growing restriction on the freedom of people to 
move has not led to fewer people crossing nationalised borders. Exactly the opposite’. 
Borders are productive and sorting devices that shape the position of foreigners in the host 
country and whose reverberation can be felt across generations, as research on the 
experiences of 
 
undocumented children in US and Europe reveal. Undocumented migrants, deportable and 
detainable in Nicholas De Genova’s (2005) terminology (See also: Bloch, Sigona, and Zetter 
2014), are produced by the inclusionary exclusion of borders and are confined to niches in 
the job market such as care, agriculture and food packaging: jobs that can’t easily be 
outsourced abroad. Reece Jones’ borders are physical, made of concrete and barbed wire. 
They build fortresses (like Fortress Europe) that are meant to be inexpungable, even against 
the evidence of over a million irregular entries in 2015 alone. Despite the intentions of the 
author, who emphasise the disruptive power of mobility, this image of borders can 
ultimately also obscure migrants agency and everyday struggles by reproducing the illusion 
of a very clear cut distinction between inside and outside, an image that the actors involved 
in the border control business love to sell to states together with their latest drones, heat 
sensors and nightlight cameras. 
 
Jones’s Violent Borders is a wake-up call for researchers, practitioners and the public that 
border struggles have not only to do with human mobility, and they don’t only concern the 
 
6 IOM Missing Migrant web portal: https://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean (accessed on 22 July 
2019). 
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West. Jones reminds us that what we are witnessing is the result of geopolitical shifts of 
global relevance, including the ongoing environmental crisis which exacerbates tensions on 
resources and produce forced displacement internally and across borders. However, De 
Genova’s warning to scholars of migration is relevant here: we ought to avoid the risk of 
becoming unwitting accomplices ‘to the spectacular task of broadcasting the one-
dimensional falsehood of border enforcement as the perfect enactment of ever more 
seamless and hermetically sealed ‘exclusionary’ barriers’ (2014: 24). Further and more 
research and debate are needed, to look beyond the homogeneous view of the border, 
beyond the rhetorical (and practical) binaries of inside/outside, domestic/foreign, and into 











Tackling one of the most acute challenges in our contemporary world, Violent 
Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move (2016) depicts a wide-ranging global migrant crisis 
and the on-going expansion of violence by nation-states. This timely and politically charged 
manuscript engages with the resurgence of borders emphasising their vast spatial and social 
dichotomies and inequalities. The proliferation of regional conflicts in Latin America, Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East, has led to a mass movement of refugees and asylum seekers 
from insecure war-torn countries desperately seeking shelter in more stable and secure 
world regions. 
 
Before probing Reece Jones manuscript and its important contribution to Political 
Geography and migration scholarship more widely, it is worth noting that the book primarily 
engages with the nation-state and it significant political and institutional role in 
(mis)managing the so called ‘global migration crisis’. In the later part of this text I question 
the nation states competence to control migration, suggesting a need to move beyond the 
state-centric approach to a more local urban focus. Doing so I point to some recent 
developments in Athens and Berlin and the more general pivotal position if cities as 
geopolitical migration hubs (Ramadan and Pascucci, 2017). The first three chapters of 
Violent Borders, represent an extensive worldwide view, from the European Union’s deadly 
Sothern shores (which I return to in further detail below), the US Mexico border, the West 
Bank Wall, Australia, and the India-Bangladesh-Myanmar border. 
 
The second part of the book explores the proliferation of borders charting their origins and 
tracing the historical roots from hunter-gatherers bordering practices and their significance 
in the 21st century post-colonial “fortress world”. ‘Borders’, Reece Jones argues, have always 
been part of the Anthropocene and have functioned to exclude those seen as a threat and 
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as unwanted strangers. The wide-ranging overview of boundaries and how they have been 
an inherent part of human existence comes with a certain lack of attention to specificity. 
With such an extensive global overview digging down to the devil in the details and bringing 
out some of the local nuances is sometimes overlooked. The strength of the book lays, 
however, in its wide geographical comparative scope and critical scrutiny of the politics of 
fear and security prioritising privileged citizens’ mobility rights over migrant human rights. 
This is echoed in Achille Mbembe (2018) recent critic of the European liberal landscape and 
its exclusionary bordering politics. Mbembe challenges the justification of predatory border 
practices by nation-states in the name of opens, liberalism and security: 
 
“One of the major contradictions of the liberal order has always been the 
tension between freedom and security... The question now seems to have 
been settled… Security is more important than freedom” (Mbembe 2018). 
 
The liberal justification for ‘freedom’ for the privileged few in need of ‘protection’, allows 
for the hostile use of ‘security’ to exclude irregular migrants in the name of ‘public safety’. 
Selective structural violence practiced by nation states bring to the fore heavily securitised 
border practices and the infliction of suffering and death at a mass-scale, turning a blind eye 
to universal human rights. This is evermore true today as all aspects of life have been 
breached by unequal geographies dividing those disparately trying to flee from the ‘wrong 
side of the fence’, with an almost certain exposure to brutal state violence and deportation. 
Militarised fault-lines have become the violent infrastructures underlying our global world 
order, with an ongoing war against mobility that excludes those in dire need of protection 
and basic lifesaving provisions (Mbembe 2018). 
 
Denouncing the rise of new and increasingly deadly security practices, throughout the book, 
Jones advocates that all borders should be open allowing people to move freely. But is this 
enough to open all national borders when migration, asylum and refugeeness, is becoming a 
challenge that is predominately urban and complexly woven inside the everyday and 
security infrastructure of cities? Where is the ‘border’ when the main state functions are 
now being embedded into urban settings? A major proportion of asylum seekers and 
refugees arrive in larger cities (at least those fortunate enough to cross the increasingly 
violent border regimes) fortified by nation states. This resonates with Jacques Derrida’s 
words foreseeing a political shift towards the urban scale; “the future prospective for cities 
to reorient the politics of the state and transform and reform the modalities of membership 
and participate in the ‘construction of solidarities yet to be invented’ holds much potential” 
(Derrida 2001: 4, emphasis in original). 
 
The migration crisis impact on major European cities, has shifted the political geographies of 
urban districts and neighbourhoods. Their populations coming together or becoming 
polarised within often-underexplored patterns; and urban geopolitical processes triggering 
local violence and conflict (Rokem and Boano 2018), the more long-term injustices of state 
led spatial planning and housing policies, and, how this affects the formation of ethnic and 
racial segregation (Musterd and Ostendorf 2013) and everyday ordinary practices of 
sanctuary (Rokem 2017). In other words, shifting the geopolitical focus from the national to 
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the urban scale is a timely conviction in the widely established migration literature focus 
concerning nation-states as the main geopolitical entities governing migration (Rokem and 
Fregonese 2017). This motivation extends beyond analysing the violence that border 
regimes inflict on migrants and refugees. Cities do not merely serve as places of diversity 
and acceptance of difference; they also hold the local infrastructures to accept and reject 
new arrivals (Sandercock 2003). A prominent example of collective moral state failure to act 
is the European Union’s lack of a unified response to irregular migration. This enduring 
tragedy with numerus undocumented deaths and displaced population lacking any basic aid 
from increasingly anti-migrant right-wing national governments, is fuelling internal and 
external political disagreement across the continent (Sigona this issue). 
 
Several conflicts in Africa, Asia and the Middle East have been ongoing for decades with 
Europe as the main vowed for ‘promised land’. In the absence of a coordinated migration 
response, with each country adopting specific strategies to suit local conditions. The default 
policy formation of a ‘Fortress Europe’ is stirring the continent as a whole towards 
nationalist rightwing anti-migrant politics. Such, defensive national policies have shifted an 
even larger number of irregular migrants to seek protection away from the hostilely of 
national authorities. The bulk of migration arriving in larger cities were local municipal 
sanctuary and aid from community groups can provide varying degrees of protection and 
services beyond the national authorities’ hostile grip. 
The ‘European migration crisis’ has shifted since its 2015 peak (Sigona, this issue), but is still 
having a major impact on the political imaginary of the continent. Varying conditions of local 
acceptance and resistance determine the fate of migrants rather than international law and 
national treaties. Democratic processes and decisions made by the public in referendums 
such as; Brexit in 2016, and, the election of right-wing nationalist Hungarian and Italian 
governments, drive towards the formation of exclusionary migration policy that halts any 
further acceptance of irregular migration and even on the political definition of ‘migrant’ as 
a unified legal category (Allen et al. 2018). The lack of capacity and political agreement by 
European national governments, is moving the policy agenda focus to mass detention and 
deportation for all new irregular migrant arrivals. The outsourcing of border practices to 
unstable regimes such as Libya is becoming the norm, where migrants face life threatening 
conditions and frequent torture and death at detention camps. 
In the last two decades European nation states consider mass-influx a burden and thus 
favoured swift repatriation, despite evidence of a positive impact on economic 
development (Türk and Garlick 2016). Policy decisions regulating the capacity to welcome or 
deport new irregular immigrants and refugees are decided according to political agendas at 
the national level. The continued disagreement over a coordinated European irregular 
migration policy contribute to a surge in nationalist and populist politics demanding borders 
to be tightened and public transport infrastructures to be securitised. 
 
The hostile national environment endorsed by the UK and other European governments 
promoting an aggressive pursuit of irregular migrants, is part of what Yuval-Davis et al., 
(2018: 239) frame as ‘everyday/everywhere bordering’ by the state apparatus and its 
institutional infrastructures towards migrants and ethnic minorities. This is shifting, more 
inclusive city administrations with an open approach towards ethnic diversity, to form local 
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flexible migration policies at the city scale. Two examples of cities which have taken 
different actions in receiving those who were fortunate to survive the tortures journey 
across the Mediterranean are Athens and Berlin. In Athens the division of immigrants and 
native Greek was relatively low by international standards until 2014, mainly because of the 
spatial structure of the housing market. This comprised a combination of stability in 
occupational structures, reduced immigration, high rates of home ownership and low levels 
of residential mobility at the time of the crisis, as well as vertical segregation within 
buildings (Maloutas 2015). In recent years a large proportion of the Syrian and other Middle 
Eastern and African migrants have landed on Greek shores with over one million 
documented in 2015. As this is their first port of arrival in route to other European 
destinations such as Berlin and Stockholm for example, the nature of settlement differs due 
to its assumed transience from the other cities above, that are seen as final destinations. 
This has created mounting pressure on housing and has resulted in several temporary 
shelters to cope with the crisis, with the Athens port of Piraeus turned into a makeshift city 
hosting several thousands of Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2016). 
 
There were over 1.1 million refugees arriving to Germany in 2015, whereof approximately 
400,000 children mainly from Syria. The country admitted more individuals than any other 
country in Europe (UNHCR 2016). As a result, the pressure on major cities such as Berlin has 
increased, adding to what has historically predominantly been migrants arriving as guest 
labour with about 30% of noncitizen residents in Berlin coming from a Turkish background 
(Anil 2006). The German political system grants strong local powers and most decisions are 
taken on the municipality level (Schmidt-Eichstaedt 2001). Thus, Berlin is regarded as an 
autonomous ‘city state’ and maintains its own sovereign authority powers and legal 
framework which have had a deceive impact on the capacity to accommodate a large 
number of migrants through municipal sanctuary housing and economic aid. The lack of 
adequate national and international responses in managing the migration crisis has meant 
local municipalities some with more and others with less resources are left to lead the way 
in aiding refugees and asylum seekers establishing their own localised versions of 
“municipal foreign policy” (Hobbs 1994). 
 
Setting aside the book’s lack of urban focus, shifting back to some of the significant points 
made in Violent Borders, Jones concludes with some thought provoking proposals for the 
creation of a conception of an alternative world. Calling for a global movement against 
borders and the construction of global laws for more just employment and education 
conditions and the application of social safety nets for the poor and the environment. The 
book appeal to a wider readership lays in its political manifesto. It is a timely wake-up call to 
re-visit one of the most taken for granted institutions of modern politics: the ‘border’. 
Jones’ closing argument is both positively provoking and daring: violent borders are not a 
given condition. An alternative world where freedom for all is prioritised over security for 
the privileged few is possible. This alternative, nevertheless, begins with a radical 
redefinition of the nation-state and its current protective and violent borders to a more 
local focus. 
 
Pointing towards one such re-definition, this brief text has proposed a need to shift some of 
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the attention in political geography and migration studies from national militarised 
faultlines to more local urban geopolitical sanctuaries and rifts. Cities and their local political 
infrastructure provide important opportunities and support for irregular migrants, and, hold 
part of the key in forging a more just global politics of migration. There is growing indication 
that local municipalities and civil society groups are better placed to grant sanctuary and 
protection to irregular migrants. While national governments violent and oppressive policies 
directed towards marginalised and excluded migrant populations are becoming part of the 
norm rather than an exception. In turn, this amounts to a need for politically charged 
resistance against national governments and their exclusionary migration policies. 
 




One of the main contributions of Reece Jones’ Violent Borders concerns its conceptually and 
empirically rich engagement with the relationship between borders, law and the history of 
capitalism in general and that of private property in particular. In this short piece, my aim is 
to sketch out Jones’ main arguments around this relationship while also trying to find 
connections with practices, policies and experiences in another geography through the 
specific example of the governance of refugees in Turkey. The Turkish case deserves specific 
attention given the ever increasing number of refugees arriving in the country and related 
development of national policies and international cooperation, primarily with the EU as 
exemplified by the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. Turkey’s governance of refugees shows how 
the historically contingent interaction between the national and the international works to 
capture mobility in ways that help move the wheels of capitalism. The discussion here is 
primarily based on chapter 5 and chapter 6. With the title of Maps, Hedges, and Fences: 
Enclosing the Commons and Bounding the Seas, chapter 5 traces contemporary borders 
back to earlier attempts in history to enclose land, territory and oceans. It does so by 
revisiting key historical moments, such as the Midlands Revolt that started in 1607, the 
Peace of Westphalia, decolonization and the newly independent states and the enclosure of 
the ocean. In re-reading these events, Jones examines the ways in which boundaries have 
served the purpose of configuring and reconfiguring space, whereby physical and structural 
violence has been central to the establishment of political and legal authority over people 
and the environment. Cautioning us against an essentialist and ahistorical understanding of 
boundaries ‘as if they have existed eternally’ (p. 117), Jones emphasizes their historical 
conditions of emergence, development and transformation as well as contestation.  
 
In revisiting the Midlands Revolt, Jones points to the centrality of boundary-making in ‘the 
enclosure of common lands into private property’, which disturbed the conventional 
relationship between land usage and people/peasants in England (p. 101). The Magna Carta 
and the Charter of the Forest as ‘The founding documents of England guaranteed the 
protection of and access to the commons’ (p. 96), where ‘land was conceived of as a space 
that might be controlled by someone but did not necessarily belong to anyone besides the 
king’ (p. 97). A few years prior to the Midlands Revolt, important developments took place, 
which transformed the access to and use of common lands by all. Population growth and 
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the commodification of agricultural goods were crucial but it was through practices of 
mapping and the physical control over space that the idea of private property took concrete 
shape. While new maps - available only to ‘an elite group that was often limited to the 
monarchy, the lords and their agents’ - were the visual means to draw boundaries around 
lands, ‘hedges and fences allowed a new form of control over space to materialize on the 
ground’ (p. 98). 
 
The Peace of Westphalia moved a similar idea of enclosure and control to the scale of the 
state, through which ‘the emergence of a system of borders to designate … new zones of 
territorial sovereignty’ (p. 106) meant the replacement of a preceding system of 
‘overlapping and contested claims to resources, people, and land’ (p. 107). The third focus 
of chapter 5 is the role that artificial borders played during colonial times, which was 
followed by the maintenance of arbitrary forms and practices of boundary-drawing 
throughout the formation of post-colonial states across Africa, Asia and the Middle East. 
Here, Jones draws an analogy between the colonial and the post-colonial periods as regards 
to the interplay between resource extraction, wealth accumulation and the control and 
enclosure of distant lands by European states. The consequences specifically for Africa have 
been ‘internal conflicts, the lack of economic development, and the difficulty of acquiring 
quality education (which) are key factors in driving many migrants to leave their homes … 
and look for better opportunities elsewhere’ (p. 111). The artificial boundaries in the Middle 
East are also at the core of internal and inter-state conflicts causing millions of people in the 
region to flee from violence, which can not to be reduced to armed conflict but should be 
studied by looking at multiple and interconnected economic, political and social origins. 
Finally, Jones examines the enclosure of the ocean as another example of the 
administration of space, where the Law of the Sea Convention (1982) provided the legal 
means to enlarge ‘the area of sovereign state control over resources’ while at the same time 
managing both movement and the ‘commercial extraction of the resources’ (p. 115). 
The analysis in chapter 5 forms the basis for the further exploration of the relationship 
between capitalism, borders and law in chapter 6 entitled Bounding Wages, Goods, and 
Workers. Jones starts with the recounting of the collapse of the Rana Plaza building in the 
Bangladeshi city of Savar, which is known for its evolution into a key site for the 
international textile industry. Having killed 1,127 people in April 2013, the incident threw 
into relief the ways in which the reproduction of capitalism and the accumulation of wealth 
are heavily reliant on income disparities and insecure and dire working conditions for 
populations living in certain parts of the world. Starting from the end of the 19th century as 
‘the golden age of capitalism’ up to the present day (p. 122), ‘borders have hardened to 
prevent the movement of workers and create piecemeal national regulations that 
corporations can manipulate’ (p. 121-122).  
 
This, as Jones continues, goes hand in hand with variations in national jurisdictions and 
restrictions imposed on human mobility through various forms of control, including 
passport and visa regulations and more physical types of territorial control through walls, 
fences and border surveillance technologies. Particularly relevant for the case of Savar are 
Jones’s arguments concerning the transfer of capital and production to distant geographies. 
Jones explains how, since the 1980s, a growing number of United States (US) companies 
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have relocated sites of manufacturing to those countries with different jurisdictional and 
regulatory authorities. This outsourcing has allowed US companies, as well as others, to 
eschew their respective national laws regarding workers’ rights, including collective labor 
agreements, environmental regulations and safety at the workplace. As sovereign ‘lines of 
distinction between different systems’ (p. 128), state borders are the underlying institutions 
for corporations to ‘capture labor’ by restricting movement, which helps maximize profits 
(p. 132). In other words, ‘borders artificially create different wages, labor pools, 
environmental regulations, taxes, and working conditions’ (p. 138), and the containment of 
people’s movement worsens income disparities, poverty and the horrid conditions in which 
capitalist production takes place in certain geographies. 
 
In the following, I will shift the focus to the governance of refugees in Turkey and attempt to 
provide new insights with the goal of moving Jones’s arguments relating to the relationship 
between law, borders and capitalism forward. Hosting the highest number of refugees in 
the world, Turkey exemplifies the simultaneous operation of the national border as a force 
of extraction and containment through state asylum policies and laws. Drawing on 
interviews with employers and workers of the Turkish industry along with domestic 
advocacy groups, Belánger and Saraçoğlu (2018) demonstrate the intertwinement of Turkish 
state laws and policies on the one hand, and the interests of the market forces on the other 
hand, in the governance of almost four million Syrian refugees residing in the country. 
Belánger and Saraçoğlu challenge the idea that neoliberalism has pushed the state into the 
background. Just the opposite, the state maintains its crucial position in devising strategies 
and implementing policies and measures with a view to assisting businesses and capital 
owners so the latter are able to endure economic crises at and beyond the national level. 
Already facing domestic and international pressures, Turkish businesses were severely hit by 
the 2018 currency and debt crisis. As I have argued elsewhere (İşleyen, 2016), the so-called 
‘refugee crisis’ has been productive in the neoliberal sense as it opened up a discursive 
space for state and non-state actors to develop humanitarian recipes for refugees that are 
in line with the interests and expectations of market forces. For Belánger and Saraçoğlu, it 
has been Syrian refugee labor that has come to the rescue of the Turkish state in its pursuit 
of a cure for the domestic economic crisis. Similar to Jones’ argument on the interplay of 
law and capitalism, Belánger and Saraçoğlu argue that the Turkish state’s temporary 
protection regime specifically designed for the Syrian displaced population ensured cheap 
and informal refugee labor, thereby satisfying the crisis-ridden domestic businesses, whose 
survival has become overwhelmingly dependent on an easily replaceable refugee 
workforce. 
 
A remarkable finding common to Jones’s and Belánger and Saraçoğlu’s findings is the 
significance of the textile industry as a major site of informal employment, particularly those 
businesses producing famous US brands. Belánger and Saraçoğlu’s interviews with Turkish 
employers illustrate a lack of interest on the side of US companies in the domestic 
conditions of employment and the security of the workspace. In other words, informal 
refugee labor in Turkey is more than a formula to treat the wounds of the domestic 
economy as it also nicely dovetails with capitalist profit accumulation at the global level. 
Based on this, I will make two additional points. As for the first point, it is useful to come 
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back to Jones’s point about the relationship between borders, law and capitalism. The 
informalization of Syrian employment in Turkey is intertwined with limitations on human 
mobility through the control of national borders. In this regard, decades of Turkey-European 
Union (EU) cooperation in border and migration governance deserve particular attention, 
especially the infamous Turkey-EU Statement of March 2016. As a candidate for EU 
membership, Turkey has, over the last two decades, undertaken significant reforms towards 
the stated objective of curbing border crossings of irregular nature into Bulgaria and Greece, 
both of which are EU member states. The 2016 Turkey-EU Statement is both a reiteration of 
this goal and a further step in migration cooperation between the two parties, who agreed 
that Turkey would take back from Greek islands all newly arrived irregular migrants who 
crossed into the EU from Turkish territories7. What is noteworthy to point out for our 
discussion here is that Turkish-EU border cooperation feeds into the precarity and 
informality surrounding refugee employment in Turkey. If national borders serve the 
capturing of labor as argued by Reece Jones (pp. 132-136), Turkey’s stopping of irregular 
mobility at its borders with the EU inevitably sustains and even exacerbates the existing 
exploitative and disciplinary state of refugee labor to be taken advantage of by the crisis 
shaken Turkish businesses and industries. 
 
Relatedly, and as second point, Turkey’s refugee policy indicates context-specific legal 
hierarchies in movement and labor conditions that go beyond the citizen/non-citizen 
dichotomy. In addition to differential rule applying to internal population circulation 
(İşleyen, 2018), non-citizen population in Turkey are subject to different legal and 
administrative categories, which determine the level of their access to basic services as well 
as to employment opportunities. This legal plurality is due to Turkey’s geographical 
limitation on the Geneva Convention meaning that only those coming from Europe can 
become refugees in the country. For the sake of illustration, I will briefly compare Syrians 
with Afghan refugees. As stated above, Turkey has introduced the so-called temporary 
protection regime to govern Syrian refugees, who have been granted some basic rights, 
such as access to education and health services. Afghan refugees on the other hand are 
considered as asylum seekers who have the right to apply in Turkey for re-settlement in a 
third country through the United Nations High Commissioners for Refugees (UNHCR). Since 
the beginning of 2018, Turkey has been witnessing a high increase in the number of border 
crossings by irregular Afghans at the border with Iran8. It would not be wrong to assume 
that these Afghans are either potential irregular border crossers into the EU or new victims 
of exploitation in the Turkish informal economy. It is because of the fact that limited 
possibilities exist in Turkey for Afghans for asylum and settlement. Despite their formal right 
to apply for re-settlement through the UNHCR Turkey, the latter announced in June 2013 
the suspension of new asylum applications from Afghans and the freezing of ongoing ones 
 
7 EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, Availableat:http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/ 
2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ (accessed on 10 August 2018). 
 
8 Attending an event organised by Turkey’s Directorate-General for Migration Management, Turkey’s 
Minister of Interior, Süleyman Soylu, stated that before the end of the first quarter of 2018, 29.899 irregular Afghans entered Turkey, of 
which 7.100 have been returned. http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberlerturkiye- 
43893911 (accessed on 20 September 2018). 
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on the grounds of case backlog (İçduygu and Karadağ, 2018). Furthermore, unlike Syrian 
refugees, Afghans are not officially permitted to live in big cities but have to reside in the so 
called satellite cities with meagre opportunities for employment and alternative forms of 
state and social support. Here again, the national border not only contains mobility but 
becomes integral to policies and practices of refugee labor extraction during crisis times. 
In short, Violent Borders offers empirically and conceptually thought-provoking insights into 
the entanglement of borders and the interests, practices and processes of capitalism with 
law as their backbone. 
 




I wrote Violent Borders in 2014 and 2015, just as the so-called European migration crisis was 
beginning, but in the halcyon days before Brexit and the 2016 US presidential election. The 
idea for Violent Borders had emerged as I was completing my first book, Border Walls (Zed 
Books, 2012), which theorized the turn to walls in the US, Israel, and India as well as a dozen 
other countries in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Vallet 2019). I argued that 
walls were not particularly effective as a security measure, but rather were a symbol of 
exclusion that marked the inside-outside space of the state and the nation. As I worked on 
that book, I noticed the dramatic increase in the number of migrant deaths globally in the 
late 2000s. While in the 1980s or 1990s, there were only perhaps a few hundred migrant 
deaths in any year, by 2014 the International Organization for Migration counted 5,287 
deaths, which, as many scholars have argued, is a problematic source and likely a severe 
undercount (Allen et al 2018; Brian and Laczko 2014; Heller and Pécoud 2017; Slack and 
Martínez 2019). When Violent Borders came out in 2016, the IOM count was over 8,000 
migrant deaths (Missing Migrants Project n.d.). In 2018, the Associated Press documented 
56,800 missing or dead migrants between 2014 and 2018, a staggering 11,000 per year (AP 
2018). 
 
I set out to do three things in Violent Borders. First, I wanted to explain why so many people 
were dying at borders today, when they had not in the past. The evidence is clear that 
increased security and immigration restrictions do not stop people from trying to migrate, 
but they do send them along more dangerous routes, which results in far more deaths at 
borders. Second, I wanted to humanize the experiences of people making these journeys by 
telling their stories. Reporting that 11,000 people died per year at borders from 2014 to 
2018 is important, but it is only a statistic, and statistics are easy for many people to 
disregard. Numbers do not have the power of the stories of a few individuals such as the 
two fifteen-year-olds I profile in the book: Sergio Hernandez Guereca, who was joking 
around with three friends before he was killed by the US Border Patrol at the El Paso-Ciudad 
Juarez border in 2011, or Felani Khatun who was killed by the Indian Border Security Force 
at the Bangladesh border in 2010 as her father looked on, helpless to do anything to save 
his daughter. The final question of the book is whether the violence of borders today is a 
new and unique phenomenon. I argue that it is new only in the scale and location of the 
violence, but that it is tied to past systems that protected privileges of a wealthy few by 
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restricting the movement of the many. In the past, slavery, indentured servitude, poor laws, 
and vagrancy laws protected privileges in a similar way to passports, citizenship documents, 
immigration rules, and border walls do today. 
 
These three reviews and engagements with the book provide useful analysis and critiques, 
as well as productive extensions of how the argument can be applied elsewhere. One of the 
most frequent critiques of Violent Borders is that it misses the particularity of specific 
borders and borderlands. This point is made by two of the reviews here. Sigona writes “The 
breath and spread of historical examples and empirical case studies makes the book a 
stimulating and engaging reading, although at times a bit bird-eyed on details, with 
idiosyncrasies and nuances lost in the process.” Rokem similarly notes “With such an 
extensive global overview digging down to the devil in the details and bringing out some of 
the local nuances is sometimes overlooked.” This is undoubtedly a feature of this book. One 
of the strengths of the disciplines of geography and border studies are the careful and 
detailed local studies of individual borders. Beyond the many studies of the US-Mexico and 
EU borderlands, some excellent examples from other places around the world are Hosna 
Shewly’s work on the India Bangladesh border (2013), the articles in this special issue on the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border (Raza and Shapiro 2019), Claire Beaugrand’s work on borders 
and Kuwaiti identity (Beaugrand 2017) or Martin Doevenspeck’s work on the Congo-Rwanda 
border (Doevenspeck 2011). However, as I watched the turn to border walls and the global 
phenomenon of migrant deaths, I felt like I was in a unique position to write a comparative 
account, drawing together these disparate strands into a broader global study. Violent 
Borders is a big picture overview of the global situation that also runs through several 
hundred years of history. Inevitably, some details will be overlooked or flattened out in this 
approach, but the comparative insights are valuable and make it worthwhile. So, these 
critiques are correct, but miss the point. 
 
Just as writing Border Walls led to the questions that drove Violent Borders, the process of 
writing about migrant deaths at borders led me to two other projects in order to fill in what 
I saw as the gaps or oversights of the book. The first project expanded on the conclusion, 
which lays out some general principles for how to address the violence of borders: freedom 
of movement across borders, global rules for worker protections, and global environmental 
regulation. I gathered together an interdisciplinary group of scholars and activists to flesh 
out what a world of open borders would look like, which became Open Borders: In Defense 
of Free Movement (University of Georgia Press 2019). 
For me, the biggest gap in the book came into focus as Violent Borders went to press in 
2016. I watched with alarm as the presidential campaign of Donald Trump rode the slogan 
“build the wall” and the racial animus of white nationalism to the presidency of the United 
States. As President, Donald Trump has continued to rely on the tropes of the racist right 
wing by describing immigration as an invasion and accusing immigrants of being murders, 
rapists, and criminals. His supporters in the media go further talking openly about racist 
theories of replacement and white genocide. Violent Borders mentions the power of 
othering and the dehumanization of migrants, but does not focus on the role of race in 
immigration debates. As I became more aware of this gap, I immediately dove into the 
archives of American immigration law and found startling parallels between the first 
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immigration laws in the United States, such as the Page Act of 1875 and the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882 that explicitly banned racial groups, and the racially charged 
antiimmigrant rhetoric today.  
 
My next book will tell the story of race and immigration laws in America from Chinese 
Exclusion to the Muslim ban in order to delineate the racist origins of immigration 
restrictions at borders. That book will be out in 2021 with Beacon Press. Now that Violent 
Borders has been out for three years, it has been interesting to see where it is read and how 
it can take on a life of its own. Two of these reviews demonstrate how the idea of violent 
borders can travel. Rokem asks us to think more about how the border is implanted in urban 
spaces while İşleyen emphasizes the connection of borders and capital by detailing Turkey’s 
governance of people from Syria. Rokem points out that while much of the focus on borders 
and migration studies is on the edges of the state, the impact of recent asylum seekers and 
refugees is often in urban areas. Consequently, he correctly suggests that simply allowing 
more freedom of movement is only part of the solution. A more just world would also 
include expanded worker protections in both receiving and sending countries as well as 
more robust programs for providing aid when people arrive. The reaction to arrivals also 
poses interesting questions, as Rokem suggests. While media narratives often focus on the 
rise of the far right, and there were indeed substantial increases in their support in 
countries ranging from Sweden to Austria, very few of these parties actually won elections. 
On the other end of the spectrum, there is evidence that suggests in spite of the anti-
immigrant talk, more people are open to more immigration now. In the US, for example, in 
2019 a Pew survey found 62% of people said that immigrants make the country stronger, 
which was the highest number ever. In 1994, the same survey found only 34% of Americans 
agreed with that statement (Pew Survey 2019). A fertile ground for additional research is on 
the geography of these different views of immigrants within particular countries, regions, 
and cities. Similarly, İşleyen focuses on the connections between neoliberal economies and 
border control. Although research has repeatedly demonstrated that immigrants have a 
positive impact on the receiving community (Clemens 2011), border controls also benefit 
corporations by controlling labor and suppressing wages. 
 
As İşleyen writes “the containment of people’s movement worsens income disparities, 
poverty and the horrid conditions in which capitalist production takes place in certain 
geographies.” It has been gratifying to see the term “violent borders” migrate out of 
geography and take root in other areas. Violent Borders has seeped into the activist lexicon 
as a something to protest against and was even the title of a documentary film. Somewhat 
surprisingly, most of my speaking invitations after the book was published have been at 
universities that do not even offer geography. However, I am a geographer at heart and it 
was an honor to receive the inaugural PolGRG/Political Geography Journal book award. 
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